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Abstract 
The Polokwane conference and South Africa’s second 
political transition: tentative conclusions on future 
perspectives 
In this phase of South Africa’s second political transition (mani-
festing characteristics of political decay) it looks as if the ANC is 
becoming more dominant, hegemonic and ideological, with 
added neo-patrimonial tendencies that are becoming more 
overt in an oligarchic manner. This article analyses the ANC’s 
Polokwane conference (qualitatively and deductively) as part of 
South Africa’s second political transition since 1994 and postu-
lates potential outcomes (scenario perspectives). 
Opsomming 
Die Polokwane-konferensie en Suid-Afrika se tweede politieke 
transisie: tentatiewe konklusies rondom toekomsperspektiewe 
In die fase wat as Suid-Afrika se tweede transisie voorgehou 
kan word (met kenmerke van institusionele verval), kom dit voor 
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asof die ANC polities meer dominant word, sterker hegemonies 
en ideologies handel, met neo-patrimoniale eienskappe wat 
sterker na die oppervlak kom en oligargies manifesteer. Hierdie 
artikel analiseer die ANC se Polokwane-konferensie (kwalitatief 
en deduktief) as onderdeel van Suid-Afrika se tweede politieke 
transisie sedert 1994 en beredeneer potensiële uitkomstes 
(scenario perspektiewe) in hierdie verband. 
1. Introduction 
During the Jacob Zuma trial(s) and especially in the post-Polokwane 
era, the language of the ANC (African National Congress), SACP 
and COSATU alliance (tripartite alliance) changed in a remarkable 
and unsettling way. Examples of the new political rhetoric include: 
Julius Malema, speaking at a Youth Day rally vowing that “... the 
youth of South Africa would die in supporting ANC president Jacob 
Zuma” (SAPA, 2008a). Malema continued at a funeral of a former 
ANCYL (African National Congress Youth League) president: “… 
Remnants of the counter-revolution including the Democratic Alli-
ance and those opposed to Jacob Zuma becoming SA’s next presi-
dent must be eliminated …” (SAPA, 2008b). Before a Zuma court 
appearance in September 2008: “If you don’t leave Jacob Zuma 
alone we will make this country ungovernable ...”, attributed to an 
unknown member of the protest group from the ANCYL outside the 
court as they burnt an effigy of Thabo Mbeki (SAPA, 2008c). This 
type of language was also levelled against Mosiuoa Lekota and 
other members of COPE. According to Mbanjwa (2008), supporters 
of Zuma chanted “kill Shilowa, kill Lekota” outside the Orange Farm 
venue where Lekota was holding a public meeting. Lekota and his 
supporters had to be escorted by police into and out of the venue. At 
other meetings, physical confrontations between the ANC and 
Lekota’s supporters broke out and police had to restore order 
(SAPA, 2008d). Zwelinzima Vavi, COSATU’s Secretary-General 
went on record saying: “I am not going to waste my time with human 
rights champions of yesterday” when asked about his exhortation to 
kill for Zuma (quoted by Mkhwanazi, 2008). 
More recently, the ANCYL proclaimed that they were disgusted by 
the remarks of “… the racist girl Helen Zille” who has “… appointed 
an all-male Cabinet of useless people, the majority of whom are her 
boyfriends and concubines so that she can continue to sleep around 
with them …”. Umkhonto we Sizwe veterans weighed in with a 
threat to make the Western Cape ungovernable: “Should Helen Zille 
not refrain from this anti-Africa and racist behaviour, we are not 
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going to hesitate, but craft and launch a political program aimed at 
rendering the Western Cape ungovernable” (SAPA, 2009). 
After years of democracy and the Nelson Mandela and Mbeki eras, 
this type of behaviour and language marked a sharp return to the 
rhetoric of revolution and contributed to the process through which, 
at the Polokwane conference, the leadership of the ANC changed by 
way of what amounts to a palace revolution.1 This rhetoric no doubt 
contributed to the redeployment of Mbeki and the resulting Zuma 
presidency, described in this article as the “second political tran-
sition”.2 The main wellsprings of rhetoric are ideologies that are built 
around the basic interests of the most important groups in society 
and that determine the relationship of the party to the rest of the 
political system (Ball, 1993:88; Newton & Van Deth, 2005:241). 
Thus, the central theoretical statement that this article proposes is 
that in the phase that can be described as South Africa’s second 
political transition, wherein characteristics of institutional decay can 
be recognised, the ANC is becoming more dominant, hegemonic 
and ideological and that these tendencies manifest in a neo-patri-
monialist and oligarchic fashion. Against this background, it is 
therefore the goal of this article to analyse (reconstruct and interpret) 
the effects of the Polokwane conference, which ignited South Afri-
ca’s second political transition and emphasised the underlying re-
commitment to the leitmotif of the national democratic revolution 
(NDR), on the ANC, regime and state. 
This is done through a deductive and qualitative process. The con-
ceptual framework explained focuses on the concepts of a state with 
a dominant-party system (as is exemplified by South Africa and the 
ANC), the role of ideology and the concept of transition. These theo-
retical perspectives are first examined and explained, in order to 
                                      
1 According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2009), a palace revolution is 
“the (freq. non-violent) overthrow of a sovereign or government, esp. by senior 
members of the ruling group”. This is in contrast to a democratic transition, 
which can be defined as “… the change from non democratic to democratic 
government, usually by the existence of at least one free and fair election” 
(Ferguson, 2006:352). 
2 The first political transition in modern South Africa was the transition away from 
apartheid towards multiparty democracy, formalised in 1994. The current post-
Polokwane era denotes the period in which political power has been transferred 
from the Mbeki faction of the ANC to the Zuma faction, with the resulting 
changes in policy, government and party structures, which for the purposes of 
this article is termed the “second political transition”. 
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provide tools for the understanding of the historical chronological 
events leading up to the Polokwane conference, the main decisions 
made at Polokwane, and the subsequent second political transition 
of South Africa through the general election of 2009. In order to 
achieve these goals, the following areas are addressed: 
• conceptualisation and theoretical perspectives on the second po-
litical transition; 
• a reconstruction of the events leading up to the National con-
ference of the ANC at Polokwane; 
• the main decisions of the National conference of the ANC at 
Polokwane; 
• the 2009 elections: Polokwane brought to the nation; 
• the second political transition in South Africa; and 
• conclusions. 
The aim of the following section is to provide a description of con-
cepts, theoretical perspectives and their relationships, thereby pro-
viding a theoretical point of departure for the article and subsequent 
analysis of the South African political environment. 
2. Conceptualisation and theoretical perspectives: 
parties within dominant-party systems 
Political parties seek to win political power and to exercise that 
power (Duverger, 1955:xxiii) within a greater whole (Sartori, 1976: 
25). Newton and Van Deth (2005:221) elaborate, stating that politi-
cal parties are organisations of politically like-minded people who 
seek political power and public office, in order to realise their poli-
cies. Parties in democracies have two central purposes: to gain 
power by winning elections, and once in power, to implement their 
public policy, which is a general set of ideas or plans that has been 
officially agreed on and which is used as a basis for making de-
cisions (Duverger, 1955:xxiii-xxiv; Newton & Van Deth, 2005:222). 
As political parties seek to gain political power or to stay in power, 
parties and politicians know that they must win the support, if not the 
hearts and minds, of their citizens (Ball, 1993:79). This is accom-
plished through ideologies built around the basic interests of the 
most important groups in society and which determine the rela-
tionship of the party to the rest of the political system (Ball, 1993:88; 
Newton & Van Deth, 2005:241). Ideology is defined as a systematic, 
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well-developed and comprehensive set of ideas and beliefs about 
politics consisting of a reconstruction of the current unacceptable 
situation, a reconstruction of an ideal situation in conflict with the 
unacceptable status quo, and a socio-political programme of change 
that will remould the unacceptable present into the ideal future 
(Newton & Van Deth, 2005:242). As such, political parties and ideo-
logies are engaged in a struggle for the position of dominance that 
will allow them to govern or influence government. Sartori (1976:72) 
distinguishes between the inter- (between parties) political system 
and the intra- (within the party) political system. The struggle for 
power described above exists on both these levels. An example of 
the interparty relations is the (conflictual) relationships between the 
ANC and other groupings that possess a political motivation or 
agenda. Intraparty relations are the (sometimes conflictual) relation-
ships between (among others) rival power centres in the party, as 
was seen between Mbeki and Zuma and is now seen, to a different 
extent, between Trevor Manuel and Gwede Mantashe. 
A transition occurs when one ideology, party or party faction sup-
plants the other. This can be done in a democratic or non-demo-
cratic way. The two ways that this can occur that are relevant to this 
article are through a palace revolution, which is a coup d’état 
executed by those already in positions of power, or a democratic 
transition, which in contrast usually includes at least one free and 
fair election (Ferguson, 2006:352). The inter- and intrarelations of 
parties described above, form the systems in which political parties 
operate. 
Party systems, the whole that Sartori (1976:25) speaks of, are pat-
terns of significant parties within a more comprehensive political 
system (Newton & Van Deth, 2005:224). A political system is a sys-
tem wherein political demands and support are converted to political 
decisions and policy (Cloete et al., 2006:40; cf. Easton, 1953). As 
such, a political system is a structural-functional model designed to 
explain political survival, maintenance, decay, and collapse (Bealey, 
2003:260). The manner and modes of the coexistence of different 
parties in the political system form the party system (Duverger, 
1955:203). In order to classify party systems, Sartori (1976:125) 
suggests starting with what he terms numerical criteria; however, 
according to Sartori this sole criterion is insufficient to describe the 
complexity of factors involved when classifying party systems. The 
major criterion for the classification of party systems is rather the 
level of competition within the system (Sartori, 1976:xi).  
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Competitive politics is conditioned not only by the presence of 
more than one party but also by a minimum of fair competition 
… below which a political market can hardly perform as a 
competitive market (Sartori, 1976:140).  
Ball (1993:91), acknowledging the complexity of the subject as de-
scribed by Sartori, uses the following criteria: the number of parties; 
the relative strength of parties; the ideological difference between 
parties; and the structure of the party. These result in the following 
classification: one-party systems (Cuba, China and North Korea), 
dominant-party systems (India, Japan), distinct two-party systems 
(New Zealand), indistinct two-party systems (the United States), two 
and one-half party systems, a stable multiparty system and unstable 
multiparty systems (Ball, 1993:91). The system most relevant to the 
subject of this article is the dominant-party system. 
Dominant-party systems differ from one-party systems in that a party 
can become so dominant in a multiparty environment that an elec-
tion victory is considered a formality. Examples of this are India and 
the Indian Congress Party, Italy and the Christian Democratic Party, 
Sweden and the Social Democratic Party, the National Party rule in 
South Africa from 1948 to 1994, and now the ANC in South Africa 
from 1994 “until Jesus comes back”, in the words of Zuma (Plow-
right, 2008). 
On this point, Gentili (2005:8) offers another valuable distinction. 
Even a dominant-party system as defined above is not necessarily 
hegemonic. In a dominant-party system, change of government is 
still possible, whilst in a hegemonic system the party in control be-
gins monitoring other parties to such an extent that these parties can 
no longer be termed competitors and change of government be-
come impossible, except by regime change. Sartori (1976:127) de-
scribes a hegemonic party as one that permits the existence of other 
parties only as subordinates, thereby limiting competition on inter- 
and intraparty levels and thus democracy within the party system 
and within the party (Sartori, 1976:140). Because there is no com-
petition for votes (alternatives), there is limited or no democracy (cf. 
Schumpeter, 1942:269). 
A dominant political party as described above becomes a de facto 
political elite, a group who is in some way superior to the rest of the 
community, which is the essence of oligarchy as defined by Michels 
(1959:21) and Duverger (1955:4), signifying governance by a small 
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organised minority or elite.3 In order to understand South African 
politics in its current form, the following theoretical points need to be 
explained. 
An example of elite governance (oligarchy) and a hallmark of African 
politics is patrimonialism (Bratton & Van De Walle, 1998:61; Thomp-
son, 2003:9). South Africa under the apartheid system serves as an 
example of this and is classified as a Settler oligarchy by Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1998:78) and a Totalitarian race oligarchy by 
Adam (1971:37-47). 
In determining this classification, Bratton and Van de Walle (1998: 
77) use only two criteria to classify African party systems in general: 
political participation and political competition. The result of this 
classification is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: African party systems  
(Bratton & Van de Walle, 1998:78)  
 
The types of regimes identified by Bratton and Van de Walle (1998: 
78-82), are all forms of neo-patrimonial rule characterised by neo-
                                      
3 In a dominant-party system, there are elites within elites. On the interparty (party 
system) level, the dominant party is an elite grouping, whilst on the intraparty 
level, the organisational elite manage the party (Sartori, 1976:71). 
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patrimonialism.4 A neo-patrimonial system according to this view-
point is a hybrid political system “… in which the customs and 
patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal 
institutions” (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1998:62). Patrimonialism is the 
concentration of power in the personal authority of the leader, whilst 
Western regimes logic focus on the supremacy of institutions as il-
lustrated by the belief in, among other principles related to demo-
cratic practice, the trias politica (cf. Thompson, 2003:107; Bratton & 
Van de Walle, 1998:61). In opposition to this point of departure, pa-
trimonial leaders treat all political concerns of the state as their own 
personal affairs; the state is their private property (Thompson, 
2003:107). The current (2008/2009) situation in Zimbabwe under the 
leadership of Robert Mugabe serves as an example. The underlying 
perspective of this example can be described as neo-patrimonialist, 
which differs fundamentally from a Western conceptualisation with 
far-reaching implications for the number of parties, the relative 
strength of parties, the ideological difference between parties, and 
the structure of the party, as identified by Ball (1993:91). 
There is a fundamental dichotomy between Western state regime 
logic and patrimonial regime logic. Western regime logic focuses on 
institutions of government and democracy, whilst the focus of neo-
patrimonial regime logic centres on the individual and big-man or 
strongman politics. The former was brought to Africa by colonialism 
and forms a part of the legacy of apartheid in South Africa. Patri-
monialism has its roots in strongman politics that became a 
characteristic of postcolonial Africa (Thompson, 2003:1070). Neo-
patrimonialism is the intertwining and fusion (synergy) of these two 
sets of characteristics, producing a form of personal rule (Thomp-
son, 2003:107). This fusion is situational and example specific; in 
other words no two neo-patrimonial regimes will necessarily be the 
same. 
Postcolonial Africa has been dominated by personal rule or patri-
monialism – this encourages competition among intragovernmental 
factions (Thompson, 2003:110). Regimes with a neo-patrimonial 
orientation need sources of legitimacy, which include violence that 
                                      
4 These regimes, as shown in Figure 1, are a plebiscitary one-party system, 
which allows limited competition and high participation. The military oligarchy is 
exclusionary, whilst the competitive one-party system allows more competition. 
Settler oligarchies are exclusionary democratic, as a part of society has access 
to the democratic process, whilst multiparty systems have high levels of 
participation and competition. 
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feeds the root of counter-violence. Therefore, the skilful personal 
ruler uses a combination of coercion and legitimacy,5 to maintain go-
vernment order and social order. Personal rulers rely on the distribu-
tion of state resources to buy legitimacy for their regimes. As long as 
patrons can nourish their followers through the manipulation of 
public goods and institutions, with the use of praetorian measures 
(that is, the military or quasi-military, such as militias; Huntington, 
2006:195), they are safe. Ethiopia, Somalia and Zimbabwe serve as 
extreme examples where as a result of, among other things, neo-
patrimonialism, the formal political system imploded. Reward for 
clients distributed through the mechanism of clientelism becomes 
the substitute for legitimacy (Thompson, 2003:111). Clientelism is a 
relation of exchange between unequals. It is a mutually beneficial 
association between the powerful and the weak. A patron extends 
public office (a salary and access to the state), security and re-
sources to his clients. The primary agent of state coercion is the 
military or quasi-military. The intervention of the military in politics or 
praetorianism, along with patrimonialism and clientelism, can be 
viewed (from a Western regime logic) as symptoms of political de-
cay. An extreme example of this is the 2008 Zimbabwe crisis where 
system implosion occurred. 
The essential background of political decay is a distinction that 
Huntington (2006:1) offers of the difference of countries regarding 
their degree of government as measured by the government’s ability 
to provide security and stability. Political decay occurs when political 
institutions can no longer cope with or regulate political participation 
and security and stability atrophies.6 Patrimonialism, praetorianism 
and clientelism are all forces that seek legitimacy for weak states or 
government in the absence of, and whilst eroding the legal-rational 
institutions of government, supplanting them with neo-patrimonialist 
(non-)institutions. 
The following theoretical propositions summarise the preceding pa-
ragraphs. 
                                      
5 This corresponds to Duverger’s (1955:151) dual nature of organisations, where 
the organisation has a democratic veneer but remains at its heart oligarchic 
6 It is important to note that the mere occurrence of political decay or its 
symptoms does not mean the end of democracy; rather it signifies that the state 
is weakening and in extreme cases, situations similar to that of Zimbabwe, 
Ethiopia and others can arise. These are worst-case examples, such as 
Somalia and Sudan. 
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• Political parties seek political power and mobilise support through 
ideologies that are formulated around the interests of the most 
important groups in society. 
• The interaction of various political parties and ideologies on the 
inter- and intraparty levels forms party systems that can be clas-
sified in various ways according to the levels of competition al-
lowed. In dominant-party systems, low levels of competition exist; 
in hegemonic systems, competition is actively discouraged. 
• A concept for the classification of African political systems is neo-
patrimonialism, which is a form of elite governance and is thus 
oligarchic (dominant and/or hegemonic) in nature. 
• Patrimonialism uses clientelism and praetorianism as sources of 
legitimacy, effectiveness and institutional or structural violence 
(such as systems of institutionalised discrimination or the main-
tenance of a party militia or paramilitary organisation). 
• The occurrence of patrimonialism, clientelism and praetorianism 
can be described as symptoms of political decay according to 
Western regime logic. 
With these concepts and the relationship between them as de-
scribed above, historical events can be interpreted and placed within 
an explanatory framework. The events leading up to the Polokwane 
conference give insight into the heart of the ANC, the tripartite 
alliance and, to a certain extent, South Africa as a whole. On the 
basis of the above-mentioned propositions, an interpretation and 
evaluation of South Africa’s second political transition can be made. 
Currently the ANC can be viewed as a dominant party, functioning in 
a dominant-party system accommodating hegemonic tendencies 
with strong ideological undertones, where support is mobilised 
through patrimonial networks and where conflict and instability is 
prominent when leadership changes are taking place. This becomes 
more evident in the following sections. 
3. The events leading up to the national conference of 
the ANC at Polokwane 
In order to understand the various events leading up to Polokwane, 
it is important to understand the ideology of the broad tripartite 
alliance and the ANC in particular. It is in terms of this ideology that 
the above-mentioned groups define themselves and generate sup-
port among the people of South Africa. 
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This ideological base of the National Democratic Movement in South 
Africa is the NDR. The importance of this revolution as dogma for 
the broad church is undeniable. In his closing speech at Polokwane, 
Zuma reiterated that the NDR is the guiding philosophy in policy 
formulation and implementation (Duvenhage, 2007:2). In the ANC 
strategy and tactics document, this “guiding philosophy” is defined 
as  
… a process of struggle that seeks to transfer power to the 
people and transform society into a non-racial, non-sexist, 
united, democratic one that changes the manner in which 
wealth is shared, in order to benefit all the people (ANC, 
2007:21).  
This process of struggle, this guiding philosophy, this NDR is today 
as relevant, if not more relevant, than before. To emphasise this the 
North West Province Premier stated: “I want to assure them that 
theirs is a legacy we shall protect and defend as we open a new 
chapter in our National Democratic Revolution.” (Modiselle, 2009:5.) 
According to the Strategy and Tactics document of the ANC dated 
2007, thirteen years after 1994, “… we are only at the beginning of a 
long journey to a truly united, democratic and prosperous South 
Africa …” (ANC, 2007:1). The 1994 elections and the end of 
apartheid were just the beginning or the first step of what will be a 
“… fundamental change in society …” (ANC, 2007:22). The NDR 
now have national and democratic tasks, and it should strive to 
realise: 
• a united state based on the will of all the people, without for 
regard race, sex, belief, language, ethnicity or geographic loca-
tion; 
• a dignified and improved quality of life among all the people by 
providing equal rights and opportunities to all citizens; and 
• the restoration of the birthright of all South Africans regarding 
access to land and other resources (ANC, 2007:3). 
The NDR thus provides the frame of reference or paradigm within 
which the tripartite alliance thinks about: 
• the state, the economy, organisational matters, the ideological 
dimensions of society and the international “… responsibility as 
one of the battalions of the global army for progressive social 
change, a disciplined force of the left” (ANC, 2007:19); 
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• the past that inflicted much wrong; 
• the need for revolution as agent of change; 
• a phased process of change – in 1993 the ANC committed to a 
period of 20 to 25 years to accomplish its strategic goals; 
• the unique South African context of the revolution; 
• the fundamental societal transformation as the ultimate result of 
the NDR; and 
• the leadership in this process of the ANC. 
It is interesting and important to take note of paragraph 230 of the 
Strategy and Tactics document (ANC, 2007:19). It simply states: 
“The struggle continues!” 
Crucially, at the time leading up to Polokwane, a part of the con-
stituency of the tripartite alliance was disillusioned with the slow 
progress of the promises inherent in the NDR. When Mbeki fired 
Zuma in 2005, he created a political opponent and a vocal advocate 
for this disillusioned constituency. Although Mbeki received the 
mantle of leader of the ANC and the South African government from 
Mandela, he was actually from much earlier on, an important func-
tionary in the ANC. According to Gevisser (2007:394), Mbeki perma-
nently changed the image of the ANC from terrorist organisation to 
government-in-waiting. He went on to establish a reputation as an 
intellectual, a well-travelled individual and someone with good rela-
tions outside of the more single-minded ANC (Gevisser, 2007:395). 
It is actually these “strong (?)” points that, even in the 1980s, gar-
nered mistrust among the hard-core ANC membership as Mbeki “… 
managed to seduce white South Africans, particularly Afrikaners, out 
of the arms of the apartheid government …” and “… so many in the 
West, too, into the arms of the ANC” (Gevisser, 2007:395). 
Unfortunately, many years later, the former president Mbeki’s lea-
dership style was insular and, whilst he achieved success and 
recognition for himself and his country overseas, people at the grass 
roots in South Africa began to feel neglected. In 2006, the ANC 
government was severely criticised for the lack of basic services to 
many areas in the country and discontent was rife, especially among 
the poorer black voters, most of whom have always supported the 
ANC.  
They feel forgotten and ignored, their feelings inflamed by their 
treatment at the hands of the local ruling African National 
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Congress … they complain that they were not consulted at all in 
the selection of the new ANC candidate … (Anon., 2006:63). 
These feelings were becoming more pervasive throughout the coun-
try and importantly also within the ANC, as Mbeki appointed people 
to the posts of premier without consulting the party. According to 
Ceruti (2007), a study showed that a third of black and coloured 
residents in the Gauteng metropolitan area were dissatisfied with 
service delivery and 44% of black residents in Gauteng towns. This 
gave rise to unrest and civil disobedience that  
... erupted again in September of 2007. The new protests, 
mainly over housing, hopped around Soweto, spreading to the 
townships of south and east Johannesburg, to Alexandra, to 
Cape Town and beyond ... Police ran out of rubber bullets 
during a day of skirmishes ... (Ceruti, 2007). 
In stark contrast to Mbeki stands Zuma, the son of a domestic 
worker, who at the age of fifteen took odd jobs to supplement his 
mother’s income. He did not receive any formal schooling, joined the 
African National Congress at a young age and became an active 
member of Umkhonto We Sizwe. In 1996, he was arrested and con-
victed of conspiring to overthrow the government. He was sentenced 
to ten years’ imprisonment, which he served on Robben Island. 
After his release, Zuma helped mobilise internal resistance and was 
instrumental in the re-establishment of ANC underground structures 
in KwaZulu-Natal. During his career, he lived in several African 
countries working for the ANC, where he rose rapidly through the 
ranks to become a member of the ANC National Executive Com-
mittee in 1977. After moving to the ANC headquarters in Lusaka in 
Zambia, he was appointed Head of Underground Structures and 
shortly thereafter Chief of the Intelligence Department (ANC, 2001). 
All this led to a very sound reputation within the revolutionary 
movement, and Zuma became a populist leader that, in contrast to 
Mbeki’s seemingly aloof dictatorial style, can lead any gathering in 
songs about the struggle, revolution and change. 
In 2005, however, Mbeki fired Zuma from his post as Deputy Pre-
sident of the country. This resulted in a party political power struggle 
and an awakened sense in the ANC for the need of renewal and 
brought internal party differences to the surface (Duvenhage, 2007: 
1; Wines, 2007). At this point, the ANC made a recommitment to the 
NDR, and Zuma seized the opportunity to approach the SACP, 
COSATU, the ANCYL and the MK veterans; the black voters that felt 
betrayed by Mbeki’s ANC. Forming alliances and portraying himself 
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as the people’s president, Zuma rescued his political career and 
formed the influential grouping in the ANC that won his election as 
President of the ANC and, eventually in 2009, the President of the 
country. This, despite the allegations of corruption against Zuma, 
who became the first new martyr for the ANC in the “second strug-
gle”, against Mbeki. 
The events leading up to Polokwane are characterised by the impor-
tance of the NDR and the various interpretations of this ideology by 
the Zuma grouping versus the Mbeki grouping. Along these 
ideological (hard-core) lines, the cracks in the once monolithic ANC 
became apparent to outsiders. The difference in the backgrounds, 
personalities and leadership styles of the two main protagonists, 
Zuma and Mbeki, served as beacons for polarisation within the 
organisation and provided the essential backdrop for the Polokwane 
conference. Given this backdrop, it is now important to look at the 
decisions made at the conference. 
4. The main decisions of the National Conference of the 
ANC at Polokwane 
Thus, the conference at Polokwane took place in an atmosphere of 
division and conflict in the governing party and its coalition. This was 
accompanied by high levels of political corruption, nepotism, contro-
versial dismissals (Vusi Pikoli and Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge) and 
a lack of action against Mbeki-loyalists (Jackie Selebi and Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang). Zuma could by then count on the support of 
the ANCYL, the Woman’s League and the majority of the votes from 
the provinces (Duvenhage, 2007:4). This, as a matter of history, led 
to the Zuma victory and provides a remarkable insight into the ANC. 
The Polokwane conference exposed the deep-rooted divisions in the 
party. Therefore, the most important decision of Polokwane was to 
give Zuma a mandate to be the new revolutionary leader who would 
form the vanguard of the internal renewal of the ANC and by doing 
so unify the divided house. It is his task to bring the ANC back in-line 
with the NDR and to bring the government in-line with the party. 
This will be done by the implementation of the other important de-
cisions made at Polokwane, which include: 
• organisational renewal and strengthening of the ANC in its com-
plementary role as both liberation movement and governing 
party; 
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• focusing the ANC as key strategic centre of power for the 
achievement of the goals of the NDR; 
• the implementation and realisation of the millennium development 
goals; 
• greater social responsibility regarding education and health in 
general, no-fee schools and housing, general health and unem-
ployment subsidies, and a new dispensation for MK veterans; 
• the restructuring and implementation of the land nationalisation 
laws; 
• a balance between economic development and the negation of 
economic inequality; 
• the ending of the floor-crossing laws; and 
• the revaluation of the provincial and local governing systems by 
2009. 
It is important to note that these decisions were reflected in the 2009 
Election manifesto of the ANC. In this sense, the measures de-
scribed above will influence the populace of the country directly and 
represent the concretisation of the ideological shift within the ANC. 
An important backlash in reaction to the decisions of Polokwane as 
mentioned above has also been felt in the ANC and the country as a 
whole. A splinter party, the Congress of the People (COPE) was 
formed to oppose the ANC from within, grabbing support from the 
heart of the parent organisation. This has angered the ANC and pro-
voked a decidedly undemocratic response among some of the 
leadership of the tripartite alliance that takes the form of threats, 
name-calling and, among the grass-roots supporters, violence 
(Mbanjwa, 2008). 
It is clear that the ANC and politics in South Africa emerged very 
different from the Polokwane conference. The scene was set for a 
palace revolution last seen in South Africa in the National Party 
when the F.W. de Klerk grouping supplanted P.W. Botha. The 
vanguard of the ANC changed, and they were placing their man, by 
way of a new ideological and personal dispensation in the final 
position for ascension to power. One patrimonial elite was replaced 
by another in order to cement the domination of the ANC as party 
within the South African party system. This process displayed hege-
monic, praetorian, and neo-patrimonialist elements. These elements 
were further emphasised by the 2009 general election. 
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5. The 2009 election: Polokwane brought to the nation 
The goals formulated at Polokwane and the recommitment to the 
NDR were expressed in the 2009 Election manifesto of the ANC in 
the following manner: 
The ANC government will: 
• Make the creation of decent work opportunities and sus-
tainable livelihoods the primary focus of our economic 
policies. We will make maximum use of all the means at 
the disposal of the ANC government, to achieve this ... 
• Ensure that macro-economic policy is informed by the 
priorities that have been set out in this Manifesto … 
Economic policy will include measures to decisively ad-
dress obstacles that limit the pace of employment creation 
and poverty eradication … 
• Ensure that state-led industrial policy leads to the trans-
formation of the economy … 
• Ensure that a comprehensive package of measures is 
introduced to promote beneficiation programs, to ensure 
that the natural wealth of the country is shared … 
• Engage the private financial sector in order to facilitate its 
transformation and diversification including the develop-
ment of the co-operative financial institutions as well as 
ensuring that the sector contributes to investment and 
developmental priorities of the country. 
• Develop programmes to promote the important role of 
mining and agriculture in employment, meeting basic needs 
and community development, and commit to continued 
transformation of these sectors to achieve national goals ... 
• Tourism and other services will be supported to expand 
work for our people. 
• Develop and invest in a programme to create large 
numbers of ‘green jobs’ … 
• Ensure that the mandates of development finance insti-
tutions are clear and truly developmental and that their pro-
grammes contribute to decent work outcomes, achieve-
ment of our developmental needs and sustainable lively-
hoods. 
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• Lead a massive public investment programme for growth 
and employment creation … 
• Step up a massive programme on expanded public works 
linked to infrastructure and meeting social needs with 
home-based care, crèches, school cleaning and renova-
tion, community gardens, removal of alien vegetation, tree 
planting and school feeding. 
• In order to avoid exploitation of workers and ensure decent 
work for all workers as well as to protect the employment 
relationship, introduce laws to regulate contract work, sub-
contracting and out-sourcing, address the problem of 
labour broking and prohibit certain abusive practices. 
Provisions will be introduced to facilitate unionisation of 
workers and conclusion of sectoral collective agreements 
to cover vulnerable workers in these different legal rela-
tionships and ensure the right to permanent employment 
for affected workers … 
• Create an environment for more labour-intensive produc-
tion methods, procurement policies that support local jobs 
and building public-private partnerships. 
• Vigorously implement broad-based economic empower-
ment and affirmative action policies and adjust them to 
ensure that they benefit more broad sections of our people 
… 
• Launch a much larger national youth service programme 
and a new national youth development agency … (ANC, 
2009). 
These measures, placing the party at the forefront of radical socio-
economic and political change in South Africa, can be seen as the 
operationalisation of the Polokwane decisions, the recommitment of 
the ANC to the NDR and the tangible way this ideology was brought 
to the people of South Africa. The reaction to this was a resounding 
vote of confidence. 
On national level, the ANC received 65,89% of the vote, the nearest 
opposition, the DA (Democratic Alliance) received 16,66%, followed 
by COPE at 7,41%, with the smaller parties losing support and 
representation. On provincial level, the ANC won major victories in 
all provinces except the Western Cape, a province that the MK 
veterans have threatened to make ungovernable (SAPA, 2009). In 
KwaZulu-Natal where the IFP (Inkata Freedom Party) had a 20% 
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showing, sporadic violence is still common. According to Mango-
suthu Buthelezi (Quintal, 2009), violence and intolerance between 
the ANC and IFP was “very bad”; “The media ... think that by not 
reporting or highlighting the violence, they will not fan the flames, 
(so) there is under-reporting.” Thus, as illustrated by Figure 2, the 
ANC (nominally) lost its two-thirds majority, the DA emerged the 
second strongest party by far, COPE was placed on the map and all 
the smaller parties lost ground. 
Figure 2: The national results of the 2009 election 
 
Now the ANC and Zuma in particular have to work towards the 
fulfilment of the manifesto promises. To this end, the SABC board is 
being reconstructed. A battle is raging around the Constitution with 
the legal and civil society accusing the Department of Justice of 
challenging the supremacy of the Constitution.  
They say a draft Bill the department has quietly introduced aims 
to change the Constitution in a way that will make Parliament’s 
decisions on one particular Act immune to the scrutiny of the 
Constitution. (Ilham, 2009:1.)  
Zuma, under pressure from the trade union that help elect him, 
wants to create 500 000 jobs by the end of 2009. The project, 
termed the National Jobs Initiative, will cost an estimated R10 billion 
(Modimoeng, 2009). This is a proverbial drop in the ocean compared 
with the public works spending programme, for which government is 
to spend R787 billion over the next three years.  
Major investment in power generation, transport networks and 
telecommunications are in progress, building an environment 
within which mining and industrial development, tourism, and 
J.C.M. Venter & A. Duvenhage 
Koers 73(4) 2008:625-650  643 
our service economy can prosper, even if the short-term outlook 
is poor. (Manuel, 2009:11.)  
This represents the many faceted changes from the Mbeki into the 
Zuma era. These changes are described in the next section. 
6. The second political transition in South Africa 
In this part of the article, the theoretical and conceptual tools pro-
vided in the first part are utilised to explain the historical events 
described above. The post-Polokwane environment is then plotted, 
in order to describe the process of change that is currently underway 
in South Africa and provide a vision for the future. 
As already mentioned, Bratton and Van de Walle (1998:78) describe 
the apartheid regime as a settler oligarchy, with a colonialist settler-
only (apartheid) government. With the 1994 election, this changed 
and South Africa became a multiparty democracy for the short 
period it took the ANC to establish unassailable dominance. 
Figure 3 illustrates these developments, using the diagram provided 
by Bratton & Van de Walle (1997:78) and applied it to the South 
African situation. A indicates the transition from a settler oligarchy to 
a multiparty democracy as formalised by the 1994 elections. B 
indicates the dominance of the ANC in every election since then with 
huge majorities, despite the DA and, more recently, COPE. C 
indicates the second political transition in South Africa. Within the 
broad transition C, several tendencies (T1 to T5) can be identified. 
Figure 3: The complexity of the second political transition 
 
Historical 
transitions 
 
Second 
transition 
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The following explains the figure above (for integration of timelines, 
compare Figure 4): 
A: The first regime change from settler oligarchy (apartheid) to 
multiparty democracy through the elections of 1994 (Figure 4: 
first block 1994). 
B: The Mandela and Mbeki eras during which the party system in 
South Africa became a dominant-party system as described in 
this article (Figure 4: second block 1994-1997 and third block 
1997-2004). 
C: The second significant transition in South African politics, 
gaining momentum and at the Polokwane conference, which 
carried through the 2009 elections and can now be seen as 
examples of government policy. Herein certain tendencies can 
be discerned: 
 T1: The broadening of democracy: COPE (a more centrist 
 party) splintered away from the ANC, the DA became 
 stronger and took over the governance of one of the 
 provinces. 
 T2: ANC dominance: The ANC is still the dominant political 
 super formation in South African politics with huge victory 
 margins in the 2009 elections and, in some instances, 
 eroding institutions of state in favour of party institutions. 
 T3: ANC dominance “turbo”: A process in which increasing 
 dominance results in lower participation and lower levels 
 of competition. 
 T4: ANC hegemony: The ANC is dominant with hegemonic 
 (contra-competition) tendencies. Opposition parties are 
 intimidated, inflammatory rhetoric is used and violence is 
 possible. 
 T5: ANC hegemony “turbo”: A process in which increasing 
 hegemony results in lower levels of competition, whilst 
 levels of participation remain high. 
D: The result of T3 and T5 in various combinations will be D, 
continuing patterns of political decay and a possible system 
implosion as a possible scenario.  
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Figure 3 and the six tendencies are the result of the synthesis of 
theoretical perspectives elaborated on in part one and the historical 
events, as related later in the article. As such, they represent a 
vision of the second political transition in South Africa. An evaluatory 
perspective consisting of the theoretical propositions vis-à-vis the 
second political transition is now added. 
7. Theoretical propositions and the second political 
transition 
Thus, the five theoretical statements given in part one of this article 
can now be expanded using examples given in other parts of the 
article. 
• Political parties seek political power and mobilise support 
through ideologies that are formulated around the interests 
of the most important groups in society. 
− The ANC recommitted to the NDR (its ideology) in an effort to 
find its identity, get rid of Mbeki and usher in the Zuma elite 
who has direct connotations to COSATU, the SACP and the 
ANCYL. In this process, various factions made various ideo-
logically motivated promises, which the economy might not 
be strong enough to fulfil. 
• The interaction of various political parties and ideologies on 
the inter- and intraparty levels forms party systems that can 
be classified in various ways. 
− The ANC experienced a period of internal turmoil, despite ex-
ternal (interparty) hegemony. This turmoil redefined the ANC 
in-line with the NDR through Polokwane and the 2009 elec-
tions, but also changed the external (party system) environ-
ment with the emergence of COPE and a stronger DA. The 
ANC also became less tolerant (more hegemonic?) regarding 
its “right” to govern. 
• A concept for the classification of African political systems 
is neo-patrimonialism, which is a form of elite governance 
and is thus oligarchic in nature. 
− The decrease in tolerance referred to above had neo-
patrimonialist, clientelist and even praetorian moments as the 
Mbeki and Zuma factions battled for supremacy. 
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• Patrimonialism uses clientelism and praetorianism as 
sources of legitimacy. 
− The changing political environment was accompanied by 
threats to purge the opposition, kill for Zuma, focus more on 
the individual and less on economic and state priorities, make 
the Western Cape ungovernable, as well as violence in 
KwaZulu-Natal, large-scale corruption, favouritism, nepotism 
and the undermining of the institutions of state. The promises 
of the ANC can be seen as a macro-clientelist programme 
that may not be economically sustainable. 
• The occurrence of patrimonialism, clientelism and 
praetorianism can be described as symptoms of political 
decay. 
− Political decay is a complex phenomenon with a variety of 
possible outcomes. In as far as the institutions of state seem 
to be weakening in South Africa, party structures becoming 
stronger and the idea of a Western (liberal) state mutating 
into a neo-patrimonialist institution, it can be said that pat-
terns of political decay are evident. 
These propositions are now subjected to a short evaluation in the 
following section and conclusions regarding these propositions are 
given. 
8. Evaluation and conclusion 
The radical rhetoric forming the shroud of the broad liberationist 
church became increasingly brazen (and inflammatory) as their can-
didate (Zuma) was threatened and the 2009 election approached. 
This reflects the new, more radical or stricter interpretation of the 
religion (the NDR) of this church. South Africa’s second political 
transition is the result of these new recommitments. Figure 4 offers a 
contextualisation of this transition by providing a time reference for 
political change in South Africa. 
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Figure 4: Contextualisation of the second political transition 
 
Figure 4 describes the flow of political change from 1983 to the 
present. Invariably the question must now be posed as to the out-
come of this transition. In this regard, the following can be con-
cluded: 
• As political parties seek power, they formulate, reformulate and 
recommit to ideologies. In this sense, the recommitment to the 
NDR was a success for the ANC at Polokwane and in the 2009 
general election. It is only logical that they will continue to use the 
radical NDR to mobilise mass support in the future. The problem 
with this is that there are promises inherent in the NDR, which if 
not fulfilled will result in a surfeit of mobilised and dissatisfied 
participants in the political system. 
• The ANC (and the tripartite alliance) have expressed increasing 
amounts of intolerance (importantly, also towards internal dis-
sidents) especially when they perceived that their agenda was 
threatened. In essence, this harks back to the roots of the orga-
nisation as a warring liberation movement rather than an evolu-
tion forward, towards a democratic culture. 
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• As one elite replaced the other, the poor got poorer, the doctors 
went on strike, the teachers proclaimed their dissatisfaction and 
various patrimonial elite elements of big government battled each 
other, rather than the problems. This elitist process is not sus-
tainable. 
• Should South African society become militarised through the use 
of militias, paramilitaries or structures to express violent threats or 
even to bring them into effect, society will degenerate into chaos. 
• This will then be the practicality of political decay and the politics 
of survival where life according to Hobbes (1904) will be 
“solitary”, “poor”, “nasty”, “brutish” and “short”. 
The hope must remain that the new democracy in South Africa will 
continue to grow and prosper despite the circumstances detailed 
above. It must be remembered that the countries hailed as great de-
mocracies around the world today had long periods of difficult 
gestation through which they evolved and grew into what we see 
today. The South African democracy is barely twenty years old. Only 
by being vigilant and by speaking truth to power, as this article has 
attempted, will a democratic culture continue to evolve. 
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